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Abstract 
International trade and economic globalization are in crisis. In the U.S. and elsewhere, 
current regimes like NAFTA and the EU, and trade deals like the TTIP and the TPP, have 
become targets for the political backlash against trade and its larger context, economic 
globalization. Brexit and the 2016 U.S. election remind us that many feel betrayed by current 
trade policies, that free trade is being imposed on them at their cost but for others’ benefit.  
At the heart of this crisis, however, there are as always opportunities. First, we have an 
opportunity to return to trade’s roots in consent. Trade is nothing more or less than the 
economic bargains we agree to, and the rules we agree on to protect, support and facilitate 
these bargains.  However, by this standard much of what passes today for trade is not really 
trade at all but something else: coercion, exploitation, or worse. Second, we have an 
opportunity to look below the surface of contemporary events, where deeper underlying trends 
point towards the early days of a larger, more inclusive set of socioeconomic relationships we 
can call global market society.  
These two lines of investigation themselves converge into the present inquiry: what kind 
of trade regulation does a global market society need in order to flourish? How is that different 
from conventional, contemporary “trade” agreements? And how do we support the most 
vulnerable workers and others marginalized by economic globalization in the process of 
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collectively pursuing these economic and social opportunities? If the heart of trade is 
consensual economic exchange, then this has ramifications throughout the entire social 
framework we use to recognize, support, protect and facilitate consensual economic 
exchanges.   
Résumé 
Le commerce international et la mondialisation économique sont en crise. Aux États-
Unis et ailleurs, les régimes actuels, comme l'ALENA et l'UE, et les accords commerciaux 
comme le TTIP et le TPP, sont devenus des cibles de la réaction politique contre le commerce 
et son contexte plus large, la mondialisation économique. Le Brexit et les élections américaines 
de 2016 nous rappellent que beaucoup se sentent trahis par les politiques commerciales 
actuelles, que le libre-échange leur est imposé à leurs dépens, mais pour le bénéfice des autres.  
Mais au cœur de cette crise, il y a toujours des opportunités. Premièrement, nous avons 
l'occasion de revenir aux racines du commerce au travers du consentement. Le commerce 
n'est, en quelque sorte, rien de plus que les opportunités économiques que nous acceptons et 
les règles sur lesquelles nous nous entendons pour protéger, soutenir et faciliter ces 
opportunités. Cependant, selon cette norme, une grande partie de ce qui passe aujourd'hui pour 
du commerce n'est pas vraiment du tout du commerce mais quelque chose d'autre : la 
coercition, l'exploitation, voire pire. Deuxièmement, nous avons l'occasion de regarder sous la 
surface des événements contemporains, où des tendances sous-jacentes plus profondes 
indiquent les premiers jours d'un ensemble plus vaste et plus inclusif de relations 
socioéconomiques que nous pouvons appeler la société de marché mondiale.  
Ces deux axes d'investigation convergent eux-mêmes vers la présente réflexion : de quel 
type de réglementation commerciale une société de marché mondiale a-t-elle besoin pour 
prospérer ? En quoi cela diffère-t-il des accords "commerciaux" conventionnels et 
contemporains ? Et comment pouvons-nous soutenir les travailleurs les plus vulnérables et les 
autres personnes marginalisées par la mondialisation économique dans le processus de 
recherche collective de ces opportunités économiques et sociales ? Si l'échange économique 
consensuel est au cœur du commerce, cela a des répercussions sur l'ensemble du cadre social 
que nous utilisons pour reconnaître, soutenir, protéger et faciliter les échanges économiques 
consensuels.  .  
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À PROPOS DE FRANK GARCIA 
Frank J. Garcia, professeur à la Boston College Law School, est l'auteur de plusieurs 
ouvrages dont le désormais célèbre « Global Justice and International Economic Law : Three 
Takes » (Cambridge University Press). Au Boston College, il enseigne et écrit dans les 
domaines de la mondialisation et des débats sur la justice internationale, du droit commercial 
international et de la théorie du droit international. Il dirige également divers projets dans le 
domaine du droit de l'investissement international, notamment le BC Law-PUC Working Group 
on Trade & Investment Law Reform et une collaboration de recherche du Boston College sur 
le financement par des tiers dans l'arbitrage international en matière d'investissement. Depuis 
2015, il est professeur invité de l’École de droit de la Sorbonne où il donne des conférences et 
enseigne aux étudiants du Master II de droit anglo-américain dirigé par le Professeur Sophie 
Robin-Olivier ainsi qu’aux étudiants du Master II spécialisé en droit des affaires et gouvernance 
mondiale. Il a également été une source d'inspiration pour le partenariat JD/LLM avec le Boston 
College qui offre des possibilités d'échange de diplômes aux étudiants de troisième cycle des 
deux côtés de l'Atlantique. 
Ce fut un moment gratifiant pour l’École de droit de la Sorbonne d'accueillir le 
Professeur Garcia et d'assister à sa conférence publique de 2017 à la Sorbonne « Rethinking 
International Trade Law in an Era of Trump and Brexit  ». Il a expliqué comment les États-
Unis, au travers des régimes actuels comme l'ALENA et l'UE, et les futurs accords 
commerciaux comme le TTIP et le TPP, sont devenus des cibles pour la réaction politique 
contre le commerce et son contexte plus large, la mondialisation de l'économie. Il nous a rappelé 
que Brexit et les élections américaines de 2016 nous laissent pour la plupart d'entre nous le 
sentiment d'avoir été trahis par la politique commerciale actuelle. Pour le professeur Garcia, il 
faut profiter de cette occasion pour regarder sous la surface de l'actualité et discerner des lignes 
de convergence plus profondes, vers une société de marché mondiale émergente plutôt qu'un 
retour à l'âge des ténèbres économiques. Il a ainsi proposé de prendre du recul et de réexaminer 
ce qu'est réellement le commerce : rien de plus ou de moins que les opportunités économiques 
sur lesquelles nous nous entendons, et les règles sur lesquelles nous nous entendons pour 
protéger et soutenir ces opportunités. 
Sa contribution à la Sorbonne Student Law Review - Revue juridique des étudiants de 
la Sorbonne converge vers une question fondamentale : de quel type de commerce une société 
de marché mondiale a-t-elle besoin pour s'épanouir ? Et comment soutenons-nous les 
travailleurs les plus vulnérables et les autres marginalisés par la mondialisation économique ? 
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Nous aimons penser que le professeur Garcia est un auteur pionnier et ouvert d'esprit, et nous 
sommes profondément d'accord avec lui qu'il n'y a jamais eu un moment plus important pour 
réexaminer la nature et la réglementation du commerce international, vers une compréhension 
plus profonde de ses possibilités progressives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As I write this, the effects of the Brexit referendum and the Trump election (also, in its 
own way, a referendum on a half-century of internationalist and neoliberal US policies at home 
and abroad) are revealing themselves in a slow-motion drama with many repercussions. Within 
trade, the economic and political integrity of the EU has been seriously challenged, and US 
trade policy is falling into deeper and deeper disarray, as current or future agreements like 
NAFTA, KORUS, the TPP and TTIP become targets for a political backlash against trade and 
its larger context, economic globalization. 
Every crisis, however, brings with it an opportunity. For trade policy, provided we can 
get below the surface waves of current trade politics, the opportunity may be to re-think what 
trade law is about. By trade law, I mean not just the law of inter-state trade relations—the 
GATT-WTO system—but international economic law (IEL) most broadly: trade, investment, 
finance, banking law—in short, the regulatory structure for the global economy. We have thus 
far pursued a kind of economic globalization that has not only left many countries behind—that 
is not new news, that has been going on for decades—but also marginalized and undermined 
the economic lives of many within our own societies. Through these referenda the British 
Midlands and the US heartland have woken the rest of us up to the fact that, at least in their 
view (and there is more than a kernel of truth in it), current global economic policies and their 
domestic effects have impoverished and disenfranchised them as they have in the developing 
world. 
How can we respond to all of this most effectively? In this essay I will offer three 
recommendations. First, that we seize this chance to re-think trade law by recovering trade 
law’s roots in consensual economic exchange. Second, that we accept that the rising inequality 
and the distributive effects of IEL within societies, not just between societies, are all problems 
of international economic law, and not “someone else’s problem”. Finally, that in responding 
to the crisis politically and legally we look as far ahead as possible and prepare ourselves for 
the next 50 years, rather than try to restore the status quo of the last 50 years, which would only 
set us up for the next crisis. 
In my view, all of this means understanding that beneath the roiled surface water of 
today’s crisis we may in fact be seeing the emergence of a global market society. The question 
for international economic law, both at the heart of the crisis and as the way out, is this: what 
kind of global market society do we want to build? 
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I. TRADE AND CONSENT 
If we want to fully understand and address the roots of the current crisis as a kind of 
reactive economic populism against contemporary global economic structures and their related 
domestic policies1, we need to better understand the nature of trade law today as a powerful 
engine for implementing economic policies throughout a global market regulation framework. 
In my view, this means returning to trade’s roots in consensual exchange. 
I.A. Trade as Consensual Exchanges 
Trade transactions are all about the expectation of a mutual exchange—they are mutual 
in nature, involving a bilateral exchange of economic value2. We can experience this in both a 
positive and a negative dimension. The simultaneous face-to-face barter transaction is perhaps 
the paradigmatic experience and image of trade and embodies this bi-laterality in its positive 
form: I hand you something of value to you, and in return you hand me something of value to 
me. 
In contrast, theft is a type of unilateral transaction, helpful in clarifying the nature of 
trade. A theft involves an involuntary transfer of value. It could be said that a theft is not a trade 
because it is unilateral, but a simple thought experiment clarifies that this is not the essence of 
the distinction. A thief in the paradigmatic “your money or your life” scenario could give you 
a cheap watch in return for your wallet, but it would still be a theft despite its bilateral quality. 
We would not call this a trade, nor would we call it even a coerced exchange. 
Thus trade must also be voluntary, which introduces the key notion of consent—both 
parties must consent to the transaction or there is some element of theft or violence. Return for 
a moment to the example of the paradigmatic barter transaction I began this section with, and 
now imagine a third person, standing behind one of the two exchange parties, holding a gun at 
her back to drive the exchange forward. Our understanding of the nature of the moment changes 
entirely—whatever it is, it is not trade. 
The voluntariness of bilateral exchange can be understood through the centrality of the 
idea of bargaining in contract law, an institution “central to our social and legal systems, both 
as reality and as metaphor”3 and “long…recognized as one of the most powerful statements of 
                                                 
1 On the role of economic populism in the Trump election, K. Himes, “The State of our Union”, Theological 
Studies, 2017, vol. 78, issue 1, p. 147. 
2 The following account is drawn from F. Garcia, Consent and Trade: Trading Freely in a Global Market, 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2018. 
3 M. Eisenberg, “The Bargain Principle and its Limits”, Harvard Law Review, 1982, vol. 95, p. 741. 
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the nature of freedom in our society”4. The notion of consensual bargain is foundational to the 
field of contract law5. If we look at the core justifications under which a contract is declared 
void or voidable—mistake, duress, or fraud—we see that they reflect the absence of or an 
impingement upon bargained-for consent6. 
I.B. B. What is Not Trade, and Why 
Based on this preliminary inquiry, I would now like to turn to an examination of several 
alternatives to trade (i.e., other economic interactions that we do not consider trade), in order to 
paint a fuller picture of what trade is and what it is not.  
I.B.1. Predation 
As Simone Weil writes, one cannot seek consent where there is no power of refusal7. At 
the private-party level, contract law recognizes this difference through the concept of duress, a 
defense to the finding of a contractual obligation. In other words, where one party’s formal 
consent to a contract was not freely given, but was given under some form of pressure, the law 
will not recognize this as a meeting of minds and will not find a contract.  
Thus through contract law’s exploration of this subtle terrain of consent and economic 
relationships, we have as a society identified a space short of the criminal law of theft, within 
which the absence of consent nevertheless has important consequences. Within that space, we 
withhold the conceptual apparatus of contractual obligation and enforcement because we have 
determined that such apparent agreements are not in fact contracts—deals, bargains, 
promises—despite the formal appearance of consent. 
I.B.2. Coercion 
Short of predation, we can recognize a subtler weakening of consent, involving what we 
call coercion. Coercion occurs when a transaction is mutual, and in some basic way consensual, 
but something weakens the fullness or freedom of the consent, short of outright theft or duress8. 
                                                 
4 T. Rakoff, “Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction”, Harvard Law Review, 1983, vol. 96, pp. 1173, 
1235. 
5 Eisenberg, op. cit., p. 741. 
6 See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
7 S. Weil, “Justice and Human Society” in S. Weil, Eric O. Springsted ed., 1998, p. 123. 
8 See generally Robert Hale’s groundbreaking essay, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State”, Political Science Quarterly, 1923, vol. 38, n.3, pp. 470-494 (even voluntary market exchanges can be 
coercive in the presence of disparities in bargaining power, resources or knowledge). I am indebted to my friend 
Jeffrey Dunoff for introducing me to Hale’s work.  
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The experience of coercion often involves a restriction on the range of possible bargains 
that the parties are free, or not free, to propose and consider. To take the paradigmatic case, if 
I want the flat-screen plasma television from a traditional “big-box” store, I have to surrender 
my right to judicial resolution of any disputes, accepting the non-negotiable arbitration clause 
embedded in the form contract9. Thus, coercion can presuppose an inequality in bargaining 
power, where one party works to limit the range of possibilities “on the table,” so to speak. The 
resulting agreement will in an important sense be voluntary, yet in an equally important sense 
will be motivated less by a desire to do the act in question, than by “a desire to escape a more 
disagreeable alternative”10. 
As with duress, contract law also wrestles with this issue and reflects this distinction 
between coerced and voluntary agreements11. As Robert Hale points out, since coercion is a 
market reality independent of the law, the law cannot eliminate coercion – at most, it can change 
the terms of coercion for better or worse12. For this reason, contract law provides particular 
protections for consumers and those with weaker bargaining power when they deal in what the 
law calls “adhesion contracts”: contracts with commercial parties or manufacturers who possess 
greater bargaining power, and which are presented in a “take it or leave it” manner13. In such 
cases, courts will look carefully before assuming the consumer consented to the adverse terms 
of the contract, despite the fact that, in all other material respects, it looks as if a contract was 
voluntarily entered into. 
I.B.3. Exploitation 
One dimension common to both theft and coercion is that the party violating our 
consent, or pressuring us for it, is present within the transaction, so to speak, as is the offending 
behavior. What about a situation in which the violation or pressure have occurred outside the 
four corners of the transaction, yet throw a profound shadow over the resulting bargain, the 
range of choices, and the decision to consent or not? In considering this possibility, we are 
uncovering the nature of exploitation. 
                                                 
9 See T. Rakoff, op. cit., pp. 1265–66 (discussing the problem of the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
contracts of adhesion). 
10 R. Hale, op. cit., p. 472.  
11On the difficult, but possible, task of drawing a line between coerced consent and no consent at all, see D. 
Beyleveld, R. Brownsword, Consent in the Law, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 345–46. 
12 R. Hale, op. cit., pp. 493–94. 
13 See T. Rakoff, op. cit., (re-conceptualizing the law of adhesion contracts). 
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To get at the nature of the experience of exploitation, theorists have used a range of 
approaches, focusing either on the fairness of the transaction or its degrading or abusive 
quality14. What the various accounts share in common is the notion of unfair advantage-
taking15. This occurs when there is a flaw in the circumstances of the transaction—Risse and 
Wollner call it a moral defect in a distribution and its history16—that, whether due to an injustice 
in the background conditions, a vulnerability17, a rights violation, or some other form of 
disrespect, results in one apparently free party seemingly inexplicably accepting a bargain that 
is not fair, but without evidence of direct coercion18. We take the party benefitting from the 
flaw to be exploiting the situation, and the vulnerable party as the exploited party. 
When applied to trade, this suggests that where a party benefits from a defect in the 
background conditions, say, or a unique economic vulnerability, to the detriment of the other 
party, the resulting exchanges are not trade, but rather exploitation. The offeree’s consent was 
granted within a restricted range of choices, a restriction that worked in favor of the offeror to 
permit a bargain that would otherwise be considered unfair. Thus any consent happens in 
response to an unfair advantage-taking that is essential to the “deal” having been struck at all. 
I.C. Trade as Public Transactions: Consensual Flows and Patterns of 
Exchange 
What does this account of consent in trade say about what we call trade between states? 
We can begin with the notion of trade between states as a transnational pattern of private 
exchanges, often (but not necessarily) facilitated by state action (here is one place where notions 
of trade and “free trade” touch). At a purely economic level, we can measure commercial flows 
of various kinds between states and call those “trade”—certainly, this is at least an element of 
what we call “trade” between states (i.e., commercial flows seen as patterns of exchange)19. 
                                                 
14 See M. Zwolinski, “Structural Exploitation”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2012, vol.29, issue 1, pp. 154, 157.    
15 A. Wertheimer, Exploitation, Princeton University Press, 1996; M. Risse, G. Wollner, “Three Images of Trade: 
On the Place of Trade in a Theory of Global Justice”, Moral Philosophy and Politics 2014, vol. 1, issue 2, pp. 201, 
214; M. Zwolinski, op. cit. 
16 M. Risse, G. Wollner, op. cit., p. 215. 
17 Vulnerability is a useful term to describe the situation that makes one ripe for exploitation, whether an individual 
or a state. See R. Goodin, “Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person”, in Modern Theories of Exploitation, 
Sage Publishing, 1987, p. 166. 
18 M. Zwolinski, op. cit., pp. 158–61.  
19 It is certainly a key element of economic globalization. See David Held (dir.), The Global Transformations 
Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Polity Press, 2nd ed. 2003, p. 67 (“flows facilitated by 
infrastructure” a key dimension of globalization). This raises an important question: if we conclude that mere 
economic flows are not enough to count as trade, then much of what is currently constituting economic 
globalization and justified publicly as “global trade” may not in fact be trade but something else. This ominous 
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But we can draw on the same thought experiments regarding theft and private exchange 
above to dig a bit deeper into patterns of exchange between states, as we did for exchanges 
between individuals. 
I.C.1. Theft and Economic Flows Between States 
Imagine if we came newly onto the scene and witnessed goods and commodity flows 
between states – we could be justified in thinking this to be trade, understood as patterns of 
exchange of economic value. Imagine further, however, that we then discovered that one state 
had recently conquered the other, and the flows we could see and measure were in actuality the 
spoils of war. Would we then be as confident that this was trade? I’m not so sure. 
What I am exploring here is whether our sense of trade versus theft at the private level, 
is in some way equally characteristic of similar patterns of exchange at the public level between 
states, when goods are exchanged by force or as the result of the past exercise of force, or 
perhaps even the ongoing threat of force. We would not be inclined, I think, to consider such 
wealth extraction to be “trade,” though the commercial flows themselves are undeniably 
essential to the relationship, whatever we may decide to call it. 
My sense is that the analogy to theft in private relations holds here. In socioeconomic 
terms, the aggregate equivalent to theft—transactions which are not mutual and where consent 
is not present—can be called wealth extraction, plundering or predation; add a political element 
and we call it imperialism or colonialism20. In these cases, there is a pattern of economic benefit 
flowing from one party to the other, but it is not mutual in a meaningful sense, and most 
importantly, it is not consensual. Rather, the flow of economic benefit in these cases is achieved 
through power inequalities as expressed by economic or military force—there is no power of 
refusal21. 
I.C.2. Coercion and Economic Flows Between States 
What if we came upon the same scene and discovered that in addition to the commercial 
flows we can see and measure, there was a treaty between the two states, calling itself a trade 
                                                 
possibility chimes with elements of the current globalization backlash. I will return to this point in the concluding 
chapter. 
20 For an interesting account of the wrongs of colonialism with respect to equality, reciprocity, agency and 
relationship, see generally L. Ypi, “What’s Wrong with Colonialism”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2013, vol. 41, 
issue 2, p. 158. 
21 Ibid. There remains the difficult issue of determining the limits of acceptable “influence” or persuasion between 
states (through forms of soft power, for example), which the discussion of coercion below only partly answers. 
SORBONNE STUDENT LAW REVIEW  2018, VOL. 1, N. 1 
REVUE JURIDIQUE DES ETUDIANTS DE LA SORBONNE   
97 
agreement, covering these commercial flows. Would this then assure us that what we are indeed 
in the presence of trade, given that the treaty was duly ratified, indicating at least formal 
consent? I’m not so sure. Consider if we dug further as before and discovered again that there 
had been an armed conflict between these states, that one state had won, and the victorious state 
had used its military advantage to compel the losing state sign an agreement formalizing a 
process of wealth extraction or “market opening”. 
The analogy to my earlier account of coercion between private parties seems valid here 
as well regarding forced agreement at the public level. States can coerce other states just as 
readily as individuals coerce other individuals. Coerced patterns of exchange between states 
seem just as much to be something other than trade, as coerced exchanges between individuals. 
Private law’s reflection on coercion within contracts suggests in the state trade situation 
that such a pattern of exchange is consensual in some important way, and yet nonconsensual in 
another important way. It seems too much to conclude that this is a theft, as we did with the 
examples of predation above. And yet, to say it is simply “trade” and go no further, also seems 
to miss the mark. Such a move would be akin to concluding under contract law that a coerced 
exchange is a contract, full stop, and ending our scrutiny of the bargain because there was in 
fact some degree of voluntary consent. 
In the private law context, we have decided we need to go further, and so too between 
states22. Nevertheless, we—and the law—are uncomfortable with this ambiguity. 
I.C.3.  Exploitation and Economic Flows Between States 
What about exploitation? Does the characterization of exploitation between private 
parties explored above also hold true at the public level? Consider again the same example of 
coming across a pattern of commercial flows between states that looks like trade and may even 
be carried out under an agreement calling itself a trade agreement. What if we discover that a 
few decades earlier the more powerful of the two states had taken active diplomatic and military 
steps to warn other powerful commercial states away from that hemisphere, declaring it to be 
uniquely the province of that powerful state, and used the resulting patterns of commercial 
dependence by the weaker states to negotiate commercial agreements in which the weaker states 
had little choice but to accept poor terms or even unilateral terms? 
                                                 
22 See D. Lefkowitz, “The Legitimacy of International Law”, in Global Political Theory, Polity, 1st ed., pp. 98, 
108 (costs of non-agreement on the part of a weaker state may not be so severe as to render the agreement non-
voluntary, yet still raise serious consent issues affecting the agreement’s legitimacy). 
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Such a pattern maps in important ways onto the private experience of exploitation I 
characterized above as being something other than trade, despite the fact that it involves 
bilateral exchanges, perhaps even some negotiation and even a degree of consent which may 
even be formalized by a treaty23. Exploitation in transnational settings has increasingly become 
a subject of normative and legal reflection, no doubt due to the salience of such unequal 
economic relationships in many global contexts, such as capital and labor in foreign 
investment24. In the inter-state context, exploitation or unfair advantage-taking may take the 
form of a range of policies, structures and institutional behaviors, which for one reason or 
another result in a situation where a state accepts from another state a poorer bargain than it 
otherwise could have pursued but for the vulnerability of its circumstances. 
Critically for our purposes, the negotiation of trade agreements themselves can be a 
form of structural exploitation—following Zwolinski’s intuition, the trade agreement is not just 
an element in the background conditions for exploitation, it is the exploitation25. Moreover, the 
trade agreement can create the conditions for subsequent private exploitations of the citizens of 
the weaker state26. 
I.C.4. Theft, Coercion and Exploitation in Contemporary Trade Agreements 
Contemporary trade practice furnishes many examples of what from a consent 
perspective does not appear to be trade at all, but can better be characterized as forms of theft, 
coercion or exploitation between states. I can only offer two examples here, one involving 
domestic law reform in the CAFTA agreement between the United States and the Central 
American States (including the Dominican Republic)27 and the other market access in the US-
Korea FTA or KORUS28. These illustrate vividly the non-trade dynamics which have 
                                                 
23 See M. Risse, G. Wollner, op. cit., pp. 211–12 (noting that exploitation is a powerful concept for the analysis of 
trade because “[a] core aspect of exploitation is that it may occur even if everybody’s fate is improved through the 
activity in question, and even if everybody participates voluntarily. Trade exhibits these features…”). 
24 See generally M. Zwolinski, op. cit. 
25 Ibid. pp. 175–77. See M. Risse & G. Wollner, op. cit., p. 211 (noting that “States can take unfair advantage of 
each other. Bigger states can exploit their bargaining power in negotiations, bilaterally or within the WTO”). 
26 I am thinking for example of a treaty whose market access provisions open an industry to unsustainable levels 
of competition, or at an unsustainably fast pace, for reasons that benefit the more powerful state. See, e.g., ibid. 
pp. 219–20 (discussing a Vrousalis’ account of exploitation as domination for self-enrichment) (“Some economists 
argue that trade liberalization may, under certain circumstances, be detrimental to a country’s prospects for growth 
and poverty alleviation (e.g. Rodrik 2007). Some such cases can be understood as exploitative. Powerful actors, 
states like the US or organizations like the WTO, that require particular institutional set-ups or the pursuit of 
specific trade and industrial policies detrimental to the prospects of weaker actors, engage in exploitation as 
domination.”). 
27 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-
Nicar.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA]. 
28 U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Kor.-U.S, June 30, 2007 [hereinafter KORUS]. 
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contributed to the widespread popular resentment of trade agreements and their domestic effects 
that we see today29. 
The CAFTA services chapter requires Costa Rica to undertake significant substantive 
revisions of its domestic agency and distribution law30. That this is even an agenda item for 
trade agreement negotiations already illustrates the powerful reach of trade policy today, with 
serious domestic implications. In this case, agency and distribution laws typically offer 
enhanced, judicially supervised protections for agents and distributors in the event of 
termination, as they are generally understood to be the weaker parties in such contracts and 
hence subject to exploitation31. The US had identified these rules, a source of frustration to US 
business, as a key goal for CAFTA reform32. The US aim was to weaken these protections for 
the benefit of foreign—in this case United States—principals. 
The treaty requires Costa Rica to weaken its agency and distribution laws in a variety 
of ways, including mandating that termination with notice—but absent any breach of 
obligation—is nevertheless to be considered termination for just cause, thus waiving all rights 
of the agent or distributor to indemnification33. Most remarkably, all such contracts, even those 
in force at the time of ratification, would now be deemed subject to private arbitration unless 
expressly subject to litigation, even though under the old law access to Costa Rican courts could 
not be waived by contract even with explicit arbitration clauses34. 
The CAFTA treaty thus requires what is in essence a retroactive modification of any 
agency and distribution contracts then currently in force to submit the parties to arbitration, by 
creating the rebuttable presumption that where the contract is silent as to judicial settlement of 
disputes, such silence indicates an intention to settle any disputes by arbitration35. The CAFTA 
provision thus also retroactively amends the Costa Rican statute by creating a presumption that 
expressly contradicts the terms of the law then in force, in a way that contradicts what are likely 
                                                 
29 For more examples, see F. Garcia, op. cit. 
30 See CAFTA, op. cit., at annex 11.13, § A, pts. 1–6 (mandating changes to Costa Rica’s Law No. 6209, “Law 
for the Protection of the Representative of Foreign Companies”). 
31 P. Perales Viscales, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Distribution Contracts: Limitations of Party Autonomy 
in Arbitration?”, Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 2015, vol. 4, issue 1, pp. 213, 219. 
32 Free Trade with Central America: Summary of the U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement, Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 17, 2003), 
https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2003/Free_Trade_with_Central_America_Summary_of
_the_US-Central_America_Free_Trade_Agreement.html (discussing dismantling distribution barriers that locked 
US firms into distributor arrangements). 
33 See D. Martinez, “At Termination, Independent Sales Reps are Anything But”, Latin American Law and 
Business Report, 1999, vol. 7, issue 5, p. 19. 
34 Ibid. 
35 CAFTA, op. cit., at annex 11.13, § A, pt. 3. 
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to have been the reasonable assumptions of the contracting parties themselves under that 
regime36. Such a modification would under contract law be unenforceable as an example of 
duress, and which works a kind of theft against the party losing valuable rights without its 
consent37. 
This imposition of arbitration by the US in an asymmetric trade negotiation seems 
particularly opportunistic and unprincipled, given that under US domestic law the imposition 
of arbitration through contracts of adhesion is one ground for their unenforceability38. In other 
words, one of the places where private firms exercise their unequal bargaining power over 
consumers is by imposing arbitration instead of litigation, and US contract law typically rejects 
such provisions. It is ironic that the US is using a highly unequal treaty negotiation process to 
impose such measures on Costa Rican parties as a class, acting as an agent of the US 
manufacturers as a class, provisions that US courts themselves would be reluctant to enforce 
in parallel private law circumstances at home. This kind of coercion at the state level also results 
in duress or even theft (understood as the non-consensual stripping of a private party’s valuable 
legal rights) with respect to private parties39. 
The prospect of CAFTA sparked huge protests in Costa Rica in 2007 in anticipation of 
a referendum on the treaty, the only referendum on CAFTA held by any CAFTA country, with 
protestors violently criticizing the treaty in terms eerily reminiscent of the terms we hear today 
in US economic populism to criticize US trade agreements40. The fact that only a slim majority 
of the 59% of eligible voters participating in the referendum voted in favor of the treaty, coupled 
with alleged irregularities in the campaign, meant that in this case the referendum failed to give 
legitimacy to the treaty or settle the issue of neoliberal integration for Costa Rica or anyone 
                                                 
36 As one author puts it, the Costa Rican case reveals that even “mandatory” laws aimed at protecting the weaker 
party in such contracts are not enough, as they are not truly mandatory under the effects of the trade regime. P. 
Viscales, op. cit., pp. 239–41. 
37 See CAFTA, op. cit., at annex 11.13, § A, pt. 4. 
38 Although the Federal Arbitration Act favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements, they are still subject to 
challenges under state law principles of unconscionability. Generally, to be unenforceable a contract of adhesion 
must be both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. Given that under CAFTA arbitration may be implied 
by law, those agreements are arguably already procedurally unconscionable. Thus, if these were U.S. contracts, 
absent the unique imprimatur of federal law, their enforceability would depend solely on the ability of their 
substantive terms to withstand strict scrutiny. See generally T. Oehmke, J. Brovins, “The Arbitration Contract—
Making It and Breaking It », in American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts, Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 3rd ed, 
2005, p. 83. 
39 As a further irony, were a state to engage in such a taking with regard to a foreign private party, it would almost 
certainly amount to a compensable expropriation under international investment law.  
40J. McPhaul, Huge Crowds in Costa Rica Protest US Pact, Reuters (September 30, 2007), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-costarica-usa-protests-idUSN3023528720070930. 
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else41. In the end, all CAFTA states formally ratified the treaty—it was unlikely that Costa Rica 
or any such small economy would jeopardize the core trade liberalization benefits it urgently 
needs from a market such as the US, even when such domestic law reforms are imposed on 
them as a price. In this sense, CAFTA might even be considered an adhesion treaty42.  
In the case of the KORUS and market access, we see a slightly different pattern of 
outcomes, but the underlying dynamics seem quite similar. In the market access area, gaining 
better access to Korean agriculture was a top priority for the US, given its comparative 
advantage in agriculture43. However, and equally importantly, maintaining the viability of an 
admittedly less efficient agriculture sector was key to the Korean government, for reasons of 
rural unemployment, orderly adjustment, food sufficiency and social stability44. 
In this area the US achieved its objective, securing commitments liberalizing access in 
virtually all Korean agricultural sectors45. The exception was rice, long considered a national 
security and cultural identity product and therefore a unique product in Korean society46. This 
certainly represents an important success for Korea. However, for our purposes here, the key 
issue may be not so much that Korea managed to maintain its rice industry protections while 
CAFTA states could not (although that is noteworthy), but whether Korean producers, even in 
other sectors, got equivalent benefits in return for the rest of the liberalization commitments. It 
is always about the balance. Unfortunately, Korea did not achieve that balance. Other than rice, 
Korea failed to achieve any of its most important goals in agriculture, textiles, services and 
trade remedies47.  
As in Costa Rica, in Korea the signing of the KORUS and its subsequent introduction 
into Parliament for ratification provoked huge public protests and much criticism of the 
                                                 
41 A. Breuer, “Costa Rica's 2007 Referendum on the Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR): Citizen Participation or Manipulation?”, Representation, 2012, vol. 45, issue 4, p. 455. 
42 See A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, West Publishing Company, rev. ed. 1993, § 1.4 (noting the origin of the 
term ‘adhesion contract’ was the international law term for a treaty which states must accept or reject despite 
having no voice in formulating its provisions). 
43 Key U.S. goals necessary for Congressional consent included agriculture liberalization, addressing the 
imbalance in Korean auto exports into the United States, and the special treatment of Korea’s outward processing 
zone or OP with North Korea, the Kaesong Industrial Complex. See also Y.-S. Lee, J. Lee, K. Sohn, “The United 
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Path to Common Economic Prosperity or False Promise”, East Asia Law 
Review, 2011, vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 111, 115. 
44 Ibid. p. 135. 
45 Ibid. pp. 135–36. 
46 Multifunctionality refers to the idea that agriculture is more than just food, and can create non-commodity 
outputs. “Multifunctionality, or Multifunctional Agriculture”, OECD (Mar. 10, 2003), 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1699. 
47 See generally Y.-S. Lee et al. op. cit.; see also  J. Schott, S. Bradford, T. Moll, « Negotiating the Korea-United 
States Free Trade Agreement », Institute for International Economics, 2006, available at 
https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb06-4.pdf (reviewing the parties’ negotiating goals). 
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government, including an opposition MP igniting a tear gas canister on the floor of Parliament 
to highlight widespread and vociferous opposition to the deal and to delay ratification48. Once 
again, the treaty was approved amidst allegations of surprise votes and procedural irregularities, 
and widespread public criticism of the domestic economic effects of the treaty were inadequate 
to stop it49. 
None of this is surprising when viewed as part of power politics between nations (though 
it may still be disappointing), but when viewed through the lens of consent, it suggests 
something other than trade is going on. Commentators suggest that in the end, the essential US 
role in Korean security, and increasing security pressures in the region, meant that Korea was 
not going to reject any trade bargain, no matter how lopsided50. Insofar as the essential US role 
in Korean security meant that Korea was not going to reject any trade bargain, no matter how 
lopsided, the US was arguably exploiting the security situation as a background condition. 
Moreover, Korea has since discovered that the coercive dilemmas around trade do not 
end when the agreement is signed. At the time of this writing, the US has just announced that 
it has “successfully renegotiated” key provisions of KORUS that it felt unfairly burdened US 
manufacturers51. The Administration was able to do so after threatening to group South Korea 
into the steel and aluminum tariffs the US planned to impose predominantly on China52. By 
doing so, the Administration succeeded in reducing Korean auto exports into the US while 
securing larger import quotas into Korea for US cars, a US goal in the initial negotiations for 
KORUS which it had not met in the negotiations themselves53. Thus through this most recent 
                                                 
48 H. Siddique, “South Korean MP Lets Off Tear Gas in Parliament”, in The Guardian (Nov. 22, 2011, 8:51 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/22/south-korean-mp-lets-off-teargas. 
49 “South Korean Lawmakers Approve Korea-US Trade Deal”, Voice of America (November 21, 2011), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korean-lawmakers-approve-korea-us-trade-deal-134315453/148562.html 
50 Ibid.; Lee et al., op. cit., p.153 (for Korea, an unbalanced agreement may not be sufficient reason not to conclude 
an FTA with the United States given its essential security role). 
51 White House Fact Sheets, “President Donald J. Trump is Fulfilling His Promise on The U.S.–Korea Free 
Agreement and on National Security”, The White House (March 28, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-fulfilling-promise-u-s-korea-free-trade-agreement-national-security/.  
52 A. Rappeport, J. Tankersley, “Trump Gets First Major Trade Deal as South Korea Looks to Avoid Tariffs”, 
New York Times, Mar. 27, 2018, at A7. Despite the threat to impose steel and aluminum tariffs on South Korea, 
there is some indication that South Korea would have been exempt from these tariffs as the United States cited 
national security concerns as the basis for imposing the tariffs and South Korea had previously been granted 
exemptions from national security concerns. J. Brinkley, “U.S.-S. Korea trade Pact Revision is Full of Holes”, 
Forbes (Mar. 27, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/03/27/us-korea-fta-revision-
is-full-of-holes/#304be1da20a3.  
53 The KORUS revisions extended U.S. tariffs on South Korean pickup trucks for 20 years, increased the quantity 
of U.S. automobile imports from 25,000 vehicles to 50,000 vehicles, and cut South Korean steel exports by 30 
percent. S. Lester, “The First Trump Trade Deal: The KORUS Renegotiation May Be Complete”, International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog, (Mar. 26, 2018, 8:23 AM), 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/the-first-trump-trade-deal-the-korus-renegotiation-may-be-
complete.html. 
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coercive action, the US was able to revisit negotiations and secure concessions that Korea had 
resisted in the first place54.   
I.C.5. Summary   
When these negotiation dynamics are considered through a consent analysis, they can 
be understood to illustrate a broader problem endemic in trade negotiations today55. Rather than 
being simply a (repeated) case of hard bargaining, trade negotiations carried out under 
conditions of such unequal bargaining power and against troubling background conditions have 
a built-in potential for coercion and exploitation. When these possibilities are acted on by 
stronger states, weaker states are compelled to negotiate bilateral and regional trade agreements 
that are inherently redistributive, further shifting power and resources from weaker states to 
stronger states56.  
When economic agreements between states work through coercive or exploitative 
dynamics instead of consensual trade, and are then forced through a referendum or ratification 
process in undemocratic or illegitimate ways, the social costs are long-term and serious. Over 
time, it is not surprising that this kind of “trade” results in the public and damaging resentments 
we see affecting global economic and political relationships today. 
However, coercive or exploitative behavior between states and the democratic deficits 
of “Other” countries are only part of the problem we face today. Developed countries have on 
the whole grown quite accustomed to watching, from what is presumed a safe distance, these 
resentments as they play out in developing countries we trade with. Trump and Brexit have 
woken us up to the necessity of considering the effects of such agreements, coupled with our 
own political deficits, on key domestic constituencies within developed states. Inequality and 
the distributive effects of trade are not just problems between states, but within states as well, 
and contemporary trade policies are implicated. 
II. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS WITHIN STATES 
To the extent that international economic law has focused on the issue of inequality, it 
has done so in terms of inequality between states. Largely overlooked has been the topic of 
                                                 
54 In return, the U.S. promised to exempt South Korea from the steel tariffs targeted at China. A. Rappeport, J. 
Tankersley, op. cit.  
55 Joseph Stiglitz also highlights such dynamics as contributing to the problems facing globalization today. J. 
Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. 
56 T. Hale, D. Held, K. Young, Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need It Most, Polity, 1st 
ed., 2013, p. 162.  
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inequality within states and how international economic law has influenced that reality. From 
the perspective of international economic law, the inequality issue is closely entwined with the 
topics of colonialism and post-colonialism, the proper meaning of development, and 
globalization. 
II.A. Inequality and International Economic Law 
International economic law has undoubtedly contributed to the rise of inequality. We 
can see that key elements of the international economic law system favor the intensification of 
inequality at national and global levels. First, at the level of trade and investment flows, while 
trade has grown within this framework, and may decrease inequality in developing countries, 
such decreases come in part by flattening wages in the middle class; moreover, trade may be 
increasing inequality in developed countries by decreasing wages and shifting jobs at the 
bottom57. Similarly, foreign investment increases inequality in home and host countries, 
outbound by facilitating transfer of low-skill jobs from developed countries, increasing returns 
to capital; and inbound in developing countries by increasing the skill premium, a good thing 
in certain respects, but also un-equalizing, promoting new elites58. Thus, while trade openness 
is generally associated with lower inequality (though at some cost to absolute income levels), 
greater financial openness is associated with rising income inequality59. 
Technological change also has a well-understood effect on inequality, which is 
magnified through trade and investment channels. New technologies intensify inequality within 
countries by increasing skill premiums, substituting automation for human labor, and 
promoting non-traditional work. The effect of new technologies is particularly acute in 
developed economies, themselves ironically also the lead innovators, where new technologies 
have contributed to the destruction or offshoring of old jobs in traditional areas of 
employment60. As older, less-skilled work is destroyed or moved offshore, a premium is 
attached to higher-skilled labor. Technology thus helps deliver a larger share of income gains 
                                                 
57 Era Dabla-Norris, K. Kochhar, N. Suphaphiphat, F. Ricka, E. Tsounta, “Causes and Consequences: of Income 
Inequality: A Global Perspective” IMF discussion note, 2015; B. Keeley, “Income Inequality: The Gap between 
Rich and Poor”, OECD Insight, 2015, pp. 33–50. 
58E. Dabla-Norris, K. Kochhar, N. Suphaphiphat, F. Ricka, E. Tsounta, op. cit.; The World Bank, Development 
Goals in an Era of Demographic Change, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-monitoring-
report; B. Keeley, op. cit., p. 42. 
59 E. Dabla-Norris, K. Kochhar, N. Suphaphiphat, F. Ricka, E. Tsounta, op. cit., p. 23 
60 See (B. Keeley 2015, pp. 42, 50). The growing importance of skill-biased technological progress for growth and 
rising demand for higher skills will lead to continued polarization of the wage distribution. 
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to the owners of capital, and a smaller share to the people who work for them through a 
reduction in human labor61. 
Third, social regulation is often both more complex and less effective on a global level, 
and national regulation is under great pressure. To take just one example, the global structure 
for income taxation facilitates tax avoidance, which in turn depresses national budgets when 
states can least afford lost revenues in confronting inequality problems, among others62. At the 
ideological level, the dominant global regulatory ideology, neoliberalism, depresses national 
social welfare systems in both dominant and client states by labeling them either protectionist 
or unsustainable and then dismantling them, thereby exacerbating inequality and limiting the 
range of domestic policy tools through which to ameliorate it63. 
Finally, global inequality is having domestic political effects, intensifying the reactivity 
of domestic politics and further complicating our policies towards inequality and political 
reform64. One can see this in everything from the Euro crisis to Brexit to the reactionary 
nationalism of US, French, Hungarian, Polish and Austrian politics, to list only a few 
examples65. Global inequality thus creates unique political problems for domestic societies, 
when socio-economic resentments and migration pressures stoke nativism, xenophobia and 
reactive domestic politics. 
This question of domestic politics brings us full circle again to the task of re-thinking 
trade law and economic globalization in the wake of Trump and Brexit. In particular, it connects 
to a further dimension of consent and trade revealed by the current crisis: the consensual 
domestic political bargains with vulnerable constituencies—the “country within the country”—
                                                 
61 See B. Keeley, op. cit., p. 42. The labor share has declined in nearly all OECD countries over the past 30 years 
and in two-thirds of low-and middle-income countries between 1995 and 2007. OXFAM, An Economy for the 
1%: How Privilege and Power in the Economy Drive Extreme Inequality and how this can be Stopped”, 2016, p. 
12, https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-havens-
180116-en_0.pdf. A declining labor share reflects the fact that improvements in productivity and growth in output 
do not translate into a proportional rise in earnings for workers, thereby severing the link between productivity 
and prosperity. 
62 OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Explanatory Statement, 2015; H. Ault, W. Schoen, 
S. Shay, “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for Reform”, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2014, 
p. 275. 
63 See D. Kotz, T. McDonough, “Global Neoliberalism and the Contemporary Social Structure of Accumulation”, 
in Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010 (documenting the hollowing out of the modern welfare state under 
neoliberalism). 
64 See generally K. Lehman Schlozman, H.. Brady, S. Verba, Citizen Voice in the New Gilded Age: Megaphones 
for a Few-Whispers for the Rest, 2016, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
65 G. Aisch, A. Pearce, B. Rosseau, “How Far is Europe Swinging to the Right?”, New York Times, Jul. 5, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/22/world/europe/europe-right-wing-austria-hungary.html 
(graphically demonstrating the rise of nationalistic politics across Europe). 
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that undergird a polity’s decision to pursue liberalized trade relations, and how our current 
domestic and global economic rules have betrayed that consensus. 
II.B. The social contract of trade – vulnerable workers 
This crisis affords us an important opportunity to consider whether we have allowed 
ourselves to believe we can pursue trade not only without consent abroad, but without 
meaningful consent at home as well. The crisis reminds us that our misunderstanding of the 
consensual nature of trade may have repercussions within our domestic societies as well as 
between trading partners. 
Addressing this misunderstanding involves looking at the intersection of economic 
consent in trade and the political process of reaching consensus—meaning shared consent, not 
unanimity—on the pursuit of a free trade policy. We can call this intersection the social contract 
of trade66. 
II.B.1. The Social Contract of Trade 
The social contract of trade involves the decisions we make as a society to pursue a free 
trade policy, and as part of those decisions, the commitments we make to vulnerable groups 
within our own society who are at risk when we undertake as a society to engage in free trade. 
It is grounded in what it means to consensually pursue a policy of free trade—transnational 
consensual exchanges—which for structural reasons having to do with national and global 
economies might nevertheless work to the temporary or permanent disadvantage of other 
members of our society. It thus includes the obligation to respect the political commitments 
made to secure consent to a free trade policy, in particular to compensate those within our polity 
who are vulnerable to trade’s downside risks. 
One important element in the social contract of trade, as I am using the term here, 
consists of the obligations we undertake towards these vulnerable workers to hold them free 
from harm, or more precisely, to ensure they are no worse off than they would have been had 
we not embarked on a free trade policy. This obligation has deep roots in liberal theory67 and 
                                                 
66 See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, “Restoring Trade’s Social Contract”, Michigan Law Review Online, 2017, vol. 116, 
pp. 78, 82 http://michiganlawreview.org/restoring-trades-social-contract/. 
67 Aaron James, for example, calls this the Duty of Collective Due Care, one of the three equitable principles he 
finds inherent in the collective social practice he calls mutual reliance on markets, or mutual market reliance for 
short. A. James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
pp. 17–18. 
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in the economic justifications for free trade68, as well as in the consensual nature of trade itself. 
It follows from the consensual nature of trade that trade policy decisions should also reflect the 
consent of those on whose behalf such agreements will, at least formally speaking, be 
negotiated. Otherwise, a trade policy decision, altering as it must the balance of rights, 
opportunities and burdens trading parties will face, risks works a kind of theft, or nonconsensual 
economic extraction, on those subject to it if there has been no consensual process underlying 
it. 
In particular, it is important that any promises made as a necessary part of securing a 
party’s consent towards free trade be honored. In an advanced capitalist welfare society, a key 
site for investigating this relationship lies in the area of adjustment assistance for displaced 
workers. Adjustment assistance consists of a package of enhanced benefits that OECD and 
other governments offer to workers who have lost their jobs as a result of trade. It is designed 
to support displaced workers as they face unemployment or under-employment, and the re-
training and relocation often necessary for them to rebuild their lives and their communities. 
For many social welfare democracies, particularly in Europe, adjustment assistance is 
seen as part of the basic social contract of their form of the welfare state69. In the United States, 
trade adjustment assistance or TAA is explicitly linked to securing Congressional support for 
free trade negotiations70, making it a kind of a special or specific social contract. In either case, 
how we deliver (or not) on our commitment to adjustment assistance following a decision to 
engage in trade is a key site for assessing the consensual nature of our trade agreements and 
trade policy, and for examining the fractured relationship between contemporary economic 
globalization and important constituencies within developed countries. I will take the US as my 
example. 
                                                 
68 See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., p. 82 (importance of domestic adjustment policies in fairly distributing gains 
from liberalized trade). See generally C. Aho, T. Bayard, “Costs and Benefits of Trade Adjustment Assistance”, 
in The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, University of Chicago, 1984, pp. 153, 157–60 
(reviewing economic justifications for adjustment assistance). 
69 See J. F. Hornbeck, Congressional. Research Service., CRS 7-7500, TAA and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 
2013, pp. 1–3 (summarizing equity arguments); C. Aho, T. Bayard op. cit., pp. 154–57 (reviewing in depth equity-
based arguments for TAA in the context of either a general or trade-specific social contract between government 
and workers).  
70 This dates back to the Kennedy Administration. See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., p. 85. See generally S. Park, 
“Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade Adjustment”, Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 2012, vol. 43, issue 3, p. 797. 
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II.B.2. Betraying the Social Contract of Trade 
The current political crisis in the US has revealed that many view the process of 
formulating a consensus for trade as broken, and the commitment to deliver meaningful trade 
adjustment assistance as having been violated71. Within the US, we have overlooked, neglected 
or actively betrayed the consent of the most vulnerable within our own polity, as we have 
pursued “trade” agreements that have similarly ignored, coerced or violated the consent of our 
trading partners. We have undermined consent both at home and abroad. 
When we look at the current terms of TAA in the US, it is sadly too apparent that we 
have in fact defaulted on the core promise of effective trade adjustment assistance for those 
whose jobs are at risk due to our decision to pursue trade. When TAA was first created in 1962, 
benefits were limited to training programs to promote re-employment, and some income 
support during the training period. Eligibility under the Act was also much more limited than 
under contemporary TAA programs, and many of the initial applications were denied72. By 
1974, when Congress next revisited trade policy, support within organized labor for TAA had 
collapsed, the unions dismissing TAA as nothing more than “burial insurance”73. In the 1980s, 
the Reagan administration proposed abolishing TAA completely, and the program lapsed 
briefly74.  
Since then, the renewal of TAA, such as it is, has always been tied to new rounds of 
trade negotiations. Congress has renewed or extended TAA each time it has granted the 
president trade promotion authority (TPA) or approved a new round of trade agreements, 
reinforcing the connection between decisions to trade and decisions to compensate at-risk 
workers, but underscoring its political vulnerability as well75. Once TPA is granted or the 
agreements ratified, TAA funding has tended to diminish, further reinforcing the many program 
defects inherent in the way TAA has been designed, and leading to widespread 
acknowledgment that TAA as currently constituted is a failure76. 
                                                 
71See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 82–84 (citing 2016 Presidential campaign poll data). 
72 The first application accepted for benefits did not take place until November 1969. E. Kapstein, “Trade 
Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment Assistance”, International Labour Review, 1998, vol. 137, 
issue 4, pp. 501, 508. 
73 Ibid. p. 509. 
74 J.-F. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 9.  
75 J.-F. Hornbeck, op. cit., pp. 10–12.  
76 See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., p 87; see also T. Meyer, “Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free 
Trade”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 2017, vol. 70, p. 985. 
SORBONNE STUDENT LAW REVIEW  2018, VOL. 1, N. 1 
REVUE JURIDIQUE DES ETUDIANTS DE LA SORBONNE   
109 
II.B.3. Restoring Trade’s Social Contract 
Fortunately, there are ways to honor the social contract of trade and repair the 
consensual basis of trade as a domestic policy. This means, however, directly addressing the 
domestic distributive effects of trade as part of trade policy, and not as a political add-on. While 
I will use the US and its TAA program as an example I suspect that, mutatis mutandis, the same 
basic issues and challenges are present outside the US in many other trading states as well, as 
the crises in Europe suggest, and that therefore these suggestions may have a wider possible 
field of application77. 
The core element in any attempt to restore the social contract of trade is to ensure first 
that any promises made in the process of securing consent for trade are in fact honored. This 
means, in the US, that we should reform how trade adjustment assistance is designed and 
delivered in the US78. The key to a successful TAA program is worker retraining towards 
sustainable re-employment. By both increasing investment in worker retraining as a percentage 
of GDP and offering a more effective training and apprenticeship process that better matches 
training to market needs, rewards early intervention (sometimes before unemployment even 
occurs), brings adequate relocation assistance and offers more thorough and effective job 
counseling, a significant number of trade-displaced workers can find alternative meaningful 
employment, as Europe has demonstrated79. 
The bottom line is that a well-designed and well-executed TAA program would fulfill 
the social contract of trade both formally and substantively80. However, meeting this obligation 
would require a deeper and more consistent commitment to funding, and here we find TAA’s 
most spectacular failure. Overall, there has been no effort to link funding levels to data on levels 
of demand or need for the program81. As a result, TAA funding has consistently been set too 
low for program needs, and has fluctuated due to political trends rather than political 
                                                 
77 See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 84–85. 
78 These suggestions also have implications for other countries as they consider how best to design effective 
compensation programs. Tim Meyer has argued that for this reason the commitment to undertake domestic 
adjustment policies should itself be internationalized in the form of commitments within trade agreements, thus 
binding all parties to a collective decision to support the social contract of trade throughout the free trade zone 
they collectively create. T. Meyer, op. cit. 
79 These successful cases are being studied widely and are starting to be emulated in other OECD countries. See 
OECD, Connecting People with Jobs: The Labour Market, Activation Policies and Disadvantaged Workers in 
Slovenia, 2016, pp. 116–118. 
80 J. Nie, E. Struby, “Would Active Labor Market Policies Help Combat High U.S. Unemployment?”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Third Quarter, 2011, pp.  43, 48, 51–54. 
81 S. Park, op. cit., pp. 847–848. 
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commitments82. Moreover, in comparative terms the United States is consistently near the 
bottom of all OECD countries in terms of adjustment spending83. This means that restoring 
trade’s social contract must address funding, and not simply program design and delivery, a 
subject I will return to at the conclusion of this essay. 
But before I do, we must enlarge the frame of our inquiry. Restoring trade’s social 
contract requires fundamental changes to domestic trade and welfare policy, beyond even the 
terms of labor adjustment assistance. However, these distributive effects and the social policies 
to address them are not confined within any one state, and in fact are part of the larger story to 
be understood in the current crisis: that we are in the throes of developing a global market and 
therefore a global market society. 
III. CONVERGENCE, GMS AND CONSENSUAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
Towards the end of his passionately argued book Making Globalization Work, Joseph 
Stiglitz urges us to consider a new “global social contract,” by which he means “an economic 
regime in which the well-being of the developed and developing countries are better 
balanced”84. However, from a sociological, epistemic and normative perspective I don’t think 
Stiglitz goes far enough, though I agree with his policy prescriptions, globalization has brought 
us far beyond the inter-state social framework that Stiglitz writes within as a backdrop to his 
prescriptions. We are in, to quote the much-missed Hans Rosling85, “an entirely new, 
converging, world”86. This means that any idea of a global social contract can no longer be 
conceived of simply as the transnational complement to a “domestic” social contract, such as 
the social contract of trade I outlined in the preceding section87. Instead, as I will argue below, 
we are in the throes of working out what a global social contract might mean for a truly global 
                                                 
82 For example, the most recent TAA reauthorization was in 2015, extending TAA through 2021 and capping the 
annual funding at $450 million, a reduction from the amounts authorized in 2009 and 2011. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Side-by-Side Comparison of TAA Program Benefits under the 2002 Program, 2009 Program, 2011 Program, and 
2015 Program 2 (Nov. 9, 2015), available at https://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/pdf/side-by-side.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YA8-MNVA]; T. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 1010–11. 
83 J. Nie, E. Struby, op. cit., (demonstrating both that the United States is third from the bottom of twenty-one 
OECD countries studied, and that the United States currently ranks second from the bottom among the thirty-five 
OECD countries in its level of TAA as a percentage of GDP, ahead of only Mexico). 
84 J. Stiglitz, op. cit., p.  285 (emphasis added). 
85 K. McVeigh, “Hans Rosling, Statistician and Development Champion, Dies Aged 68”, The Guardian (Feb. 8, 
2017, 2:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/07/hans-rosling-obituary. 
86 Hans Rosling’s 200 Countries, 200 Years, 4 Minutes (BBC television broadcast July 25, 2017).  
87 This discussion of the boundaries between domestic and global, and its relation to the social contract metaphor, 
echoes longstanding debates over the boundaries of Rawls’ liberal project. See, e.g., F. Garcia, Trade, Inequality 
and Justice: Towards a Liberal Theory of Just Trade, Brill – Nijhoff, 1st ed, 2003, pp. 124–28 (reviewing what 
was even then an old debate). 
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socioeconomic space, a global social contract built around shared participation by people as 
well as countries in a global market. 
Such a social contract should not and realistically cannot entirely supplant what we now 
consider as the domestic social contract. However, its emerging reality fundamentally alters the 
space within which any society works out its own foundational commitments. In particular, the 
possible emergence of a global social framework means that the question of consent is not 
simply a question for states in their “internal” and “external” trade relationships. As economic 
exchanges become global, the regulation of economic exchanges and the concomitant 
protection—or weakening—of consent also become global. We thus face the possibility of 
constructing a consensual—hence dynamic and flourishing—or oppressive global 
socioeconomic framework. 
I will first summarize below the socioeconomic and normative convergences within the 
global space today, about which I have written more fully elsewhere88. These convergences 
fundamentally alter the domain within which any adequate response to the current crisis must 
find traction, since they point towards the emergence of a global market society, within which 
our aspirations for opportunity and fairness must now take place. 
III.A. Convergences 
In my view, there are two principal kinds of convergence at work today, the 
socioeconomic and the normative, that at their confluence point to one thing: an emerging 
global market society89. 
III.A.1. Socioeconomic Convergence  
III.A.1.a. The Global Economy is Deepening 
Perhaps the most salient converging trend is the globalization of the economy. 
Contemporary data suggests the emergence of a global economy characterized by diminishing 
geographic segregation, decreasing discrimination according to source, and increasingly 
integrated global production processes, with both transactional and institutional 
                                                 
88 See F. Garcia, “Convergences: A Prospectus for Justice in a Global Market Society”, Machester Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2016, vol. 13, issue 2, p. 128. 
89 I don’t mean to say that this is an inevitably teleological process, and of course the politics of the moment seem 
to suggest the opposite. However, I do believe that underneath the surface of politics one sees these deeper trends 
and processes, even as we have serious cause for concern about maintaining and deepening the progressive 
possibilities inherent in these trends. 
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manifestations90. Trade as a percentage of global gross domestic product rose from 27% in 1970 
to 43% by 1995, and then to 59% by 201491. Foreign direct investment has risen from 
approximately $10 billion in 1970 to $320 billion by 1995, and then to $1.56 trillion by 201492. 
This surge in FDI has in turn facilitated the development of global value chains, within which 
nearly half of world trade in goods and services takes place93. 
Therefore, both in absolute and relative terms, and over time and to the present day, 
outcome-based indicators illustrate the deep connections characteristic of a global economy. 
Removal of institutional impediments has been a necessary condition for such cross-border 
integration, and in this respect, institutions (and through them, states) have largely demonstrated 
a commitment to global economic integration94. 
This presents us squarely with a question: what kind of global economy are we creating?  
III.A.1.b. Global Inequality is Worsening  
For one thing, we seem to be creating a very unequal one. The problem of inequality is 
not new, yet economic globalization has intensified the nature of inequality today to 
astronomical proportions. To summarize some contentious statistics, overall we see today a 
disturbing reversal of the 20th century trend towards growth with lower inequality95. Global 
inequality (between people, across countries) greatly exceeds national inequality (.70 Gini 
versus .40s for US, .20s to .30s for Europe)96. While it may be that inequality between countries 
is decreasing and a lower percentage of the world’s population lives in poverty (thanks largely 
to the gains in China and India), inequality within countries is increasing, at least partially 
                                                 
90 P. Lloyd, “Global Economic Integration”, Pacific Economic Review, 2010, pp. 71, 72. 
91 Trade (% of GDP), The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?start=1970 last 
visited July 15, 2016). 
92 Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$), The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?end=2014&start=1970 (last visited July 15, 2016). 
Between 1970 and 2014, FDI as a percentage of global GDP has risen continuously, from 0.5% in 1970 to 2% in 
2014, ibid. 
93 World Trade Organisation., International Trade Statistics 2015, 2015, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf. Global value chains allow firms to “do” the 
part of the process they are best at, using intermediate goods and services from elsewhere without having to 
develop a whole industry. OECD, « Interconnected Economies: Benefitting from Global Value Chains », 2013, 
available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/interconnected-economies-GVCs-synthesis.pdf. 
94 Ibid, p.  95. 
95 T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2013; 
F. Garcia, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century. By Thomas Piketty”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
2015, vol.18, issue 2, p. 188 (reviewing Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”). 
96 F. Bourguignon, “Inequality and Globalization: How the Rich Get Richer as the Poor Catch Up”, Foreign 
Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2016, p. 11; see also Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN), Inequality Matters: 
Report on the World Social Situation 2013, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/345, 2013 (reviewing recent trends in global 
inequality). 
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offsetting reductions in global inequality. Depending how you read the data, it could be that 
domestic inequality entirely offsets reductions in global inequality—it could even be that 
overall inequality has increased despite the gains mentioned97. 
As discussed above, major elements of the international economic law system as 
configured today favor the intensification of inequality at national and global levels. The pattern 
of allocations generated by the international institutions which today frame and regulate the 
global economy raises significant distributive concerns, in areas as diverse as taxation, access 
to capital, control over natural resources, and the social costs of investment, to name a few. 
These patterns present a host of compelling social, political, legal and normative issues for 
international economic law since, as the regulatory framework of the global economy, all of 
these issues land in its lap, so to speak98. There is much work to be done to ensure that the 
global economy works fairly for everyone. 
III.A.1.c. Global Social Relations are Thickening 
Economic globalization is embedded in a larger framework of social, informational and 
symbolic globalization with immense consequences for economy, politics and society. 
Globalization is transforming human relationships in ways that affect our inter-connectedness, 
the basis for solidarity, and the effective reach of our awareness, understanding and actions 
with respect to others. I can only summarize here what I discuss at greater length elsewhere99; 
but in essence globalization is contributing to the emergence of elements of global community 
around a range of institutional practices and common challenges100. 
The intensification of global social and economic interaction—in areas as diverse as 
global finance, refugee crises, terrorism, climate change—create common interests and can 
contribute to the subjective awareness of a shared fate101. These build on what can be called a 
                                                 
97 C. Lakner, B. Milanovich, “Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great 
Recession”, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS6719, 2013 (correcting for underreporting of 
high-income levels across national data sets leads to significantly higher levels of global inequality (.76 as 
measured by national Gini coefficients)); see also Bourguignon, op. cit. (noting this possibility). 
98 See Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN), op. cit.,(inequality poses serious threats to wellbeing of 
people at all levels of the income distribution); The World Bank, Development Goals in an Era of Demographic 
Change, 2015, (inequality one of three top challenges to development today). See generally T. Piketty, op. cit.; J. 
Stiglitz, The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them, W. W. Norton & Company, 
2015; E. Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Ethics, 1999, vol. 109 Ethics, p. 287. 
99 See generally See F. Garcia, Global Justice and International Economic Law: Three Takes, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Of course, they can also lead to divergence, suspicion, resentment, and resurgence nationalism as well. For a 
heartfelt and searching examination of how these global dynamics have contributed to the causes and politics of 
these darker responses in recent times, see K. Himes, op. cit. 
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community of knowledge, created by global social media and the information revolution so 
characteristic of our everyday experience of globalization. Thanks to these infrastructures, we 
know so much—more than ever before—about how we collectively experience these and other 
risks, 24/7, around the globe, instantaneously. Finally, globalization is also building a set of 
shared understandings and practices around how we respond to such risks and to globalization’s 
opportunities as well102. We see this in areas such as the use of markets and the regulation of 
markets through law and institutions, as well as in new and emerging regimes around challenges 
as diverse as climate change and global tax avoidance103. 
Together this represents in my view a trend towards a fundamental shift in social 
organization on the planet104. One of the surprising features of this new global social space is 
how it resembles what we used to call “domestic” space, which also consists of regions of 
wealth, urbanization and industrialization, and regions of agrarianism, poverty and 
underdevelopment, all linked by an overarching framework of economic, legal, political and 
social networks of causality, influence and responsibility. We are in the habit of associating this 
“domestic” space with an identifiable community structured by a set of shared social norms and 
governance institutions, and for these reasons also used to contrasting it to the “international” 
on the basis of the absence of such elements in the latter. However, because of globalization, 
we can no longer easily oppose this “domestic” space of communities to the “international” 
space “between” communities and insist that the latter lacks shared understandings and 
institutions. It is all simultaneously local and global105. 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., F. Garcia, “Between Cosmopolis and Community: Globalization and the Emerging Basis for Global 
Justice”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2013, vol. 46, p. 1. 
103 See OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan, 2013, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; Fiona Harvey, “Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s 
Greatest Diplomatic Success”, The Guardian (Dec. 14, 2015, 2:51 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-
nations. 
104 See, e.g., D. Messner, “World Society—Structures and Trends”, in Global Trends and Global Governance, 
Pluto Press, 2001, p.  22. Perhaps, if not a world of “us,” at least a world of “I and Thou”? See M. Buber, “I and 
Thou”, 1937. 
105 See W. Gabardi, Negotiating Postmodernism, University of Minnesota press, 2000, (“globalization is marked 
by the development of diverse, overlapping fields of global-local linkages . . . [creating] a condition of globalized 
panlocality . . .”). See generally S. Sassen, Territory, Authority and Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, 
Princeton University Press, 2008. 
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III.A.2. Normative Convergence 
III.A.2.a. International Economic Law is Unifying 
As the global economy continues to deepen, formerly distinct areas of international 
economic law are converging into a single, unified body106. The functionalist paradigm of 
disparate international economic law regimes established by states to address specific issues is 
breaking down in the face of the deepening interconnections between policy areas and the 
linkage issues these connections create. 
This convergence also reflects the deepening of the global economy, as the global 
commercial integration of goods, services, labor, intellectual property and capital comes to 
reflect more and more the way a “domestic” economy operates. Within a well-run domestic 
economy, regulations covering these disparate aspects of economic activity are harmonized 
through legislative and administrative action and brought into as close a working relationship 
as possible, for efficiency reasons. The fact that international economic law is undergoing a 
similar process is both evidence of the larger convergences I am charting, and an opportunity 
to ensure in a coordinated fashion that global economic regulation is not only efficient in the 
narrow economic sense, but also efficient in the broader long-term sense, sustainably 
supporting a flourishing global society. 
III.A.2.b. Global Law is Emerging 
The evolutions in international economic law are part of a larger process of law’s 
adaptation to the new global social reality107. Through globalization, we see in addition to the 
usual abundance of “national” and “international” law-making, an increase in the number of 
bodies producing “softer” norms, often through transnational processes, that influence or guide 
                                                 
106 There is a small but growing body of literature analyzing the parallels between trade law and investment law 
and arguing their convergence. See, e.g., R. Alford, “The Convergence of International Trade and Investment 
Arbitration”, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 2013, vol. 12, p. 35; T.  Broude, “Investment and Trade: 
the ‘Lottie and Lisa’ of International Economic Law?”, TDM Special: Intersections: Dissemblance or 
Convergence Between International Trade and International Investment Law, 2011; R. Echandi, M. Newson, 
“Influence of International Investment Patterns in International Economic Law Rulemaking: A Preliminary 
Sketch”, Journal of International Economic Law, 2014, vol. 17, issue 4, p. 847; S. Puig, “The Merging of 
International Trade and Investment Law”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 33. Not all 
commentators, however, fully accept the comparison or agree with the convergence thesis, for a variety of reasons. 
See, e.g., N. Di Mascio, J. Pauwelyn, “Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two 
Sides of the Same Coin?”, The American Journal of International law, 2008, vol. 102, pp.  48, 53–55 (contrasting 
the trade and investment regimes in terms of goals and political economies). However, in my view the similarities 
outweigh the differences. 
107 Or, as Zumbansen characterizes it, “attempts towards the development of an appropriately designed framework 
of legal analysis and regulation in light of a radically disembedded regulatory landscape.” P. Zumbansen, 
“Transnational Legal Pluralism”, Transnational Legal Theory, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, p. 141. 
RETHINKING TRADE LAW IN AN ERA OF TRUMP AND BREXIT 
116 
state or private actor behavior or facilitate coordinated regulation by states108. We can see such 
transnational norm creation in a number of areas spanning the waterfront of global social policy, 
from crime to tax to food safety and beyond109.  
In response, “traditional ‘national’ legal responses that draw on architectures of 
normative hierarchy, separation of powers and unity of law are likely to fall short of grasping 
the nature of the evolving transnational normative order”110. The business of law is becoming 
both transnational and global111. A defining feature of regulation in the new global space is a 
dynamic pluralism involving the interaction of different types and sources of law, with manifold 
effects on different actors and in different spaces, and subject to contending ideologies112.  
III.A.2.c. Global Justice and Development Discourses are Transforming 
The final convergence I want to trace involves our post-war discourse concerning the 
issues of fairness raised by complex socioeconomic activity and regulation both “within” and 
“across” the “national.” Conventional development discourse has been trapped in certain 
contradictions and assumptions that are no longer viable if they ever were. The very idea of 
development began in an unstable binary structure: “we are the developed nations, you are not”. 
To this it added a specific teleology: you want to be like us and to have what we have, in the 
way we have it—you exist to become us. 
Global justice also investigates the subjects that development concerns itself. As Gilbert 
Rist reminds us, justice discourse too has been marked by the binary structure, yielding a 
bifurcated vision for a just society: the democratic social welfare state in the countries of the 
North, and “development” programs in the South113. In political philosophy Rawls typifies this 
                                                 
108 The Basel Accords and the Basel Committee process are a good example, as is the OECD’s BEPS Project, both 
in collaboration with the G-20. See, e.g., OECD, op. cit.; I. Drumond, “Bank Capital Requirements, Business 
Fluctuation Cycles and the Basel Accords: A Synthesis”, in Issues in Finance: Credit, Crises & Policies, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010 (tracing the channels through which the Basel Accords influence central banking policy and 
therefore the domestic business cycle and overall macroeconomic stability). On the soft law phenomenon, see 
generally G. Shaffer, M. Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance”, Minnesota Law Review, 2010, vol 94. p. 706. 
109 See generally D. Messner, op. cit., pp. 34–40; P. Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal 
Theory, Global Governance and Legal Pluralism”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 2012, vol. 
21, issue 2, pp. 305, 312–13 (cataloguing global social challenges calling for transnational approaches).   
110 P. Zumbansen, op. cit., p. 153. 
111 See F. Garcia, “Globalization’s Law: Transnational, Global or Both?”, in The Global Community: Yearbook of 
International Law and Jurisprudence 2015, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 31. 
112 See P. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders, Cambridge University Press, 
2012; P. Zumbansen, op. cit.. See generally F. Garcia, op. cit., p. 4 (discussing the necessary role of pluralism in 
global justice theory). 
113 G. Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, The University of Chicago Press, 
4th ed., 2014. 
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split: investigating the justice of institutional frameworks, or what Rawls calls the “basic 
structure”, is a key task for political theory, but conceived of as a domestic inquiry114. 
Globalization has rendered such binary structures and assumptions unsustainable for 
critics and advocates of justice and development alike. “North” and “South”, “developed” and 
“developing”, all of these binaries are increasingly blurred, challenged and deconstructed 
through globalization’s alchemical properties115. The most visible effects are in the economy, 
where globalization raises profound questions for justice and development: how is the global 
economy affecting growth, returns on investment, wealth creation, inequality, production and 
employment patterns, innovation, and human capital investment within both national and 
transnational economic spaces—in short, all of the social conditions of vital interest to 
development and justice alike. 
Economic globalization also enlarges the set of institutions, actors and relationships 
which justice must consider. We must now include both domestic institutions, such as public 
and private law, the political process, and socioeconomic structures such as the market; and 
their international correlates such as international law and international organizations, together 
with the global market and its international and domestic regulatory bodies; as well as the range 
of private and quasi-private actors involved in transnational norm creation116. 
Globalization is thus critically reconstructing the discourse around global justice and 
development, towards a new global post-development discourse around, simply, justice. If 
justice is the first virtue of institutions, and institutions are increasingly transnational in scope, 
then so too must the justice conversation be transnational.  
III.B. At the Vanishing Point: A Global Market Society?  
From my perspective, these convergences—economic, social, regulatory and 
normative—point towards a newly emerging global space, with key characteristics that 
challenge our settled categories and create new opportunities for meaningful economic, social 
and legal activity. For one thing, the transnational space within which what we used to call 
                                                 
114 For Rawls, beyond national boundaries, different fairness norms apply. See Rawls, op. cit., at 3–10; P. 
Maffetone, “The Law of Peoples: Beyond Incoherence and Apology”, Journal of International Political Theory, 
2011, vol. 7, issue 2, p. 191. 
115 See generally F. Garcia, op. cit.; see also F. Garcia, Transcending a Binary View of Development and Justice: 
Globalization, Opportunity and Fairness, 2016, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
116 In global justice theory these are referred to collectively as the “global basic structure.” See F. Garcia, op. cit., 
p. 174; A. Føllesdal, “When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why the Global Basic Structure Should Be 
Democratic”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2008, vol. 16. Issue 2, p. 585. 
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development is supposed to take place, now resembles more closely what we think of as 
domestic space, than it does our traditional accounts of the international context of 
development. Moreover, our ongoing investigation of justice, traditionally limited to national 
spaces, has found the very notion of national space exploded by and permeated with the global, 
dramatically expanding the boundaries for the justice conversation. And international economic 
law has grown from a set of functionally specialized regimes that structure the transnational 
economic relationships of national economies, into a steadily-integrating framework regulating 
an emerging global economy through global legal processes. 
Globalization is creating this space, but we have not yet fully recognized it or absorbed 
its implications, nor have we thoroughly examined and recast or rejected old legal and 
normative tools and invented new ones117. If we want to fully respond to the current crisis, 
which means understanding what economic justice will mean for the 21st century, we need to 
try to understand this new social space. 
III.B.1. Emergence of Global Market Society 
One way to characterize the social space that is emerging is as a global market 
society118. That it is global, can readily be seen from the nature of contemporary globalization 
and its transnational effects on social connections, in particular on economic transactions and 
business practices and the increasingly global means by which we regulate them. That it is 
based on markets, understood here as networks constituted by acts of buying and selling 
facilitated through a medium of exchange119, is also clear from the kinds of economic 
interactions and relationships that constitute it, by the institutions and regulatory structures 
employed to govern it (principally through international economic law), and by the ideology 
these structures follow120.  
                                                 
117 As Rist writes, development is no longer about “the success or failure of this or that ‘development project’ but 
a general way of envisaging harmonious and equitable cohabitation of all those living today—and in the future—
on this planet. Rist, op. cit.; see also V. Bornschier, “The Civilizational Project and Its Discontents: Toward a 
Viable Global Market Society?”, Journal of World-Systems Research, 1999, vol. 5, pp. 165, 175 (existing 
international agreements and regimes have not yet grown to reflect the political consequences of globalization). 
118 The debt to Polanyi in what follows is clear. K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation , 1944; see also Bornschier, 
op. cit. (recognizing the emergence of a global market society and offering a critique of its current structure that 
points towards its progressive possibilities). 
119 K. Hart, C. Hann, “Introduction: Learning from Polanyi”, in Market and Society: The Great Transformation 
Today, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
120 I use the term ideology here in its classical sense, as a set of ideas and values favoring markets over other forms 
of socioeconomic organization, recognizing full well the more pejorative uses of the term in connection with 
neoliberalism and “free market” ideology, a mistake to which I will return below.  
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That it is a global market society is perhaps the most controversial characterization of 
the three, but in my view this is what the convergences outlined above point to121. One simple 
working definition of society could be “a large group of people sharing decisions and work 
around a common life”122. At the global level, we to see evidence that work is shared through 
a global market, and that decisions are shared—to the extent they are shared—through some 
blend of national and transnational political and regulatory processes123. 
III.B.2. Economic Regulation in the Global Market Society 
To the extent that globalization is understood as extending a particular version of market 
ideology—under-regulated capitalism or the “Washington Consensus”, for example—
globalization and the very idea of a global market will naturally be resisted as inimical to the 
interests of the non-capital classes124. While I agree with the substance of this critique, I think 
the underlying conflation of markets with neoliberalism is a mistake, reflecting an 
understandable normative judgment about the global spread of under-regulated capitalism as a 
particular form of market society, more than a considered judgment of the idea of a global 
economy or a market society per se125. 
Equating markets and market regulation with a specific—and contested—market 
ideology masks the power of the market as an idea that cuts across social models, ideologies 
and levels of development126. Markets are here to stay, and in my view that is a good thing. As 
Sen has written, the freedom to participate in both the market for labor and the market for 
products is a key freedom, intrinsically and instrumentally, and therefore a cornerstone of 
development for anyone in any country127. 
                                                 
121 See also, e.g., K. Hart, “Money in the Making of World Society”, in Market and Society: The Great 
Transformation Today, op. cit., p. 91 (humanity formed a world society—understood as a single interactive social 
network—in the latter part of the 20th century, massively unequal and imperfect, yet a society nonetheless). 
122 “Society”, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/society (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018). 
123 I go deeper into this and the points above in my essay on convergences and IEL. See generally Garcia, op. cit.. 
124 See A. G. Hopkins, “Globalization in World History”, Pimlico, 2002, pp. 42–43 (2002) (dangers posed by 
weakened regulatory power over capitalist system). Had Polanyi lived and worked during the current era of 
globalization, he might well agree, given his central concern with the dangerous “fiction” of a self-regulating 
economy. K. Polanyi, op. cit., pp. 31–32. However, I consider the equation of the two—globalization and 
neoliberalism—to be a mistake, as I explain above. 
125 In this sense, I read Polanyi not as an indictment of market society understood as a society relying on markets 
for economic organization, but as an indictment of a society organized by markets—neoliberalism, in other words.  
The task, which this project seeks to contribute to, is to reassert the primacy of society over economy, even 
(especially) in a market society. See K. Polanyi, op. cit., p. 259. 
126 D. Slater, F. Tonkiss, Market Society: Markets and Modern Social Theory, Polity, 2001.  
127 A. Sen, “Development as Freedom”, Anchor, 1999, pp. 6–8. 
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Neoliberalism notwithstanding, market societies have certain structural weaknesses and 
are prone to certain kinds of oppressive tendencies, such as the tilt towards inequality that 
Piketty warns us of and which we see playing out globally today128. In response, market 
societies seeking some degree of social stability and sustainability develop social practices or 
domestic institutions capable of supplementing and mitigating the rigors of capitalism even 
minimally, for example by compensating the “losers” through some form of wealth transfer129. 
Aaron James calls this the practice of mutual market reliance130. By this, James means 
something beyond the shared practice of relying on a domestic market model: the mutual 
reliance on the emerging global market itself, as a transnational market that lives in, through 
and beyond the sum of each state’s individual markets. This shared practice is itself generative 
of a broader set of global social relationships and practices that deeply inform the nature and 
challenges of regulating a global market and keeping it roughly fair. 
III.B.3. Consent and the Global Market Society 
The emergence of a global market society has profound consequences for how we 
approach transnational problems of politics, economics and law, including how we chart a 
course out of the present crisis. Realizing this opportunity depends entirely on how the global 
market is regulated and according to what norms, and the recent referenda tell us we have so 
far done this badly. This opens up new opportunities for economic law, which plays an essential 
role in safeguarding markets through defining and protecting consensual economic 
agreements131, to play this role on a global level towards a truly global network of consensual 
exchanges. 
The key is recognizing that a flourishing trading system which respects the consent of 
its private individual and state participants, will incidentally also be a more just system of global 
economic relations, since individuals and states will have fewer reasons to accept bad bargains, 
and will instead negotiate and conclude more equitable bargains at the transactional and treaty 
levels. A truly consensual system of trade will therefore promote similar outcomes to what we 
have sought to promote through the global justice debate, but through a route that ideally cuts 
across normative traditions, does not assume a difference between “development” and domestic 
                                                 
128 See T. Piketty, op. cit.; see also D. Slater, F. Tonkiss, op. cit., pp. 34–35 (noting disorder, irrationality and 
oppressive behavior as endemic to market societies, not “transitional” problems); supra notes 100–104 and 
accompanying text (growing inequality).  
129 D. Slater, F. Tonkiss, op. cit., p. 120.  
130 A. James, op. cit..  
131 D. Slater, F. Tonkiss, op. cit., p. 105. 
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justice, and seems intuitively plausible to any market participant, thus fitting into the larger 
social and economic norms of an emerging global market society. 
IV. PROTECTING CONSENT AND PURSING FAIRNESS IN A GLOBAL MARKET SOCIETY 
Taking full advantage of the current crisis in global trade and politics means opening 
ourselves to the full range of implications when we set up trade and other economic structures 
at a global level, structures that deeply impact our own societies and the societies of our 
economic partners. This means we must work to build consensual trade agreements, agreements 
that directly address the domestic distributive effects of the global market, within a larger 
framework of building a balanced and inclusive global market society that offers opportunity 
and fairness for all participants. 
IV.A. Creating Genuine Trade Agreements 
Agreements such as CAFTA and KORUS contain provisions that are significantly 
unbalanced in terms of the rights, interests and goals of the various negotiating parties, and are 
by no means unique in this respect. Understanding why this is so requires that we recognize the 
(unsurprising) truth that power inequalities tend to produce unbalanced agreements, and the 
greater the inequality, the more the unbalance. What is perhaps more surprising is that we have 
allowed ourselves to believe that this is trade, when in fact it seems to better fit patterns of what 
in other areas we call predation, coercion and exploitation. 
If we want to address these dynamics and thereby begin to undo the damage which these 
recent referenda have both revealed and intensified, the most important first step is to change 
our expectations of trade agreements. Once we understand the consensual nature of trade, then 
it follows that the policy goal of international trade law should be more than simply liberalizing 
commercial flows by eliminating economically distorting domestic legislation. The goal should 
be to maintain an environment in which trade can take place and flourish, much as the goal of 
economic regulation in a domestic setting is to protect and promote a healthy and thriving 
market, which means recognizing, protecting and promoting consent at all levels. Put another 
way, promoting and protecting a healthy and thriving global market requires more than simply 
reducing or eliminating protectionist regulation: it means building a trading system and not a 
disguised system for predation, coercion, or exploitation. 
If we work to change our understanding of trade and therefore what we expect of our 
leaders when they negotiate trade agreements, and what we are willing to support or protest as 
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citizens and consumers, we have gone a long way towards altering the political environment in 
which trade—or oppression—takes place. Going farther requires a look at how we might 
change trade negotiations, even between highly unequal parties, to take this new understanding 
into account when we negotiate new agreements. 
Negotiations among unequal parties, whether they involve explicit coercion or 
exploitation, need not always result in bad bargains—it all depends on how the negotiations are 
managed132. Scholars analyzing trade negotiations note a variety of strategies both “away from 
the table” and “at the table” which weaker parties can in fact pursue to attempt to offset this 
disadvantage. While these strategies are far from perfect and the success stories are perhaps 
outnumbered by the failures, they are nevertheless a starting point towards consensual 
agreements, particularly when they follow from a changed paradigm of trade and are coupled 
with domestic and transnational policies addressing the distributive effects of trade. 
IV.B. Wealth Transfers and Economic Inequality 
If we hope to fully respond to the current crisis, we must accept that it is unsustainable 
to inflict neoliberalism abroad while maintaining social welfare state at home when we are 
living in a global economy and an emerging global market society. But what should be done 
instead? This depends on very complex causality issues, but at heart it is about working 
comprehensively to ensure opportunity and fairness for all in a global market society.  
For international economic law this means first ensuring that the global economy itself 
promotes opportunity and fairness. We need to reform international economic rules and 
institutions where they exacerbate inequality in areas such as trade and investment133, tax 
law134, IMF and World Bank lending135, global finance136, resource and borrowing 
                                                 
132 J. Odell, “Negotiating from Weakness in International Trade Relations”, Journal of World Trade, 2010, vol. 
44, issue 3, pp. 545, 545. 
133 See, e.g., F. Garcia, L. Ciko, A. Gaurav, K. Hough, “Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons 
from International Trade Law”, Journal of International Economic Law, 2015, vol. 18, issue 4, p. 861 (discussing 
reform of investment treaty framework). 
134 I. Benshalom, “The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International Trade and Tax Law”, 
NYU Law Review, 2009, vol. 85, issue 1; J. Repetti, “Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax 
Equity”, Vanderbilt Law Review, 2008, vol. 61, p. 1129. 
135 F. Garcia, “Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions”, in The Future of International Economic Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
136 R. Buckley, E. Avgouleas, D. Arner, Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation, Cambridge 
University Press, 2016. 
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privileges137, and policies favoring multinational corporate immunity138. We also need to 
reform the rules by which global institutions operate through unequal governance structures, to 
enhance the voice of the members most burdened by development and inequality challenges 
and most affected by institutional policies139. 
Going beyond this, we also need to ensure that IEL is reformed to support efforts to 
realize opportunity and fairness through our domestic institutions and policies. In IEL terms, 
this means protecting policy space for local measures aimed at ameliorating inequality. IEL 
institutions should incorporate as a policy something like the principle of subsidiarity pioneered 
at the institutional level by the EU: if there are successful local policies, how can we protect 
their policy space, support similar policies and policy experimentation in other “locales”, and 
scale them up for transnational or global application as appropriate? Some countries have been 
able to buck the trend of rising inequality, suggesting that domestic social and economic 
policies can play a crucial role in determining inequality trends140. IEL institutions must ensure, 
at a minimum, that their policies support such successful local efforts, so the multilateral level 
can work as partner, not overseer141. 
Both strands—the fairness of the international economic law system itself, and its 
impact on the fairness of domestic societies—come together around the need to protect and 
fulfill the social contract of trade as outlined above. A properly designed and implemented 
adjustment assistance program is key to honoring trade’s social contract. Going a step farther, 
how we fund such programs is also key. In my view, it would be most consistent with the social 
contract of trade, understood as a promise from all of us to those most at risk from free trade, 
that the funding to support those most vulnerable to trade come from trade itself. While this 
could in principle be done through traditional legislative redistribution of the gains from trade, 
                                                 
137 T. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity, 2nd ed, 2008; 
L. Wenar, “Property Rights and the Resource Curse”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2008, vol. 36, issue 1. 
138 See, e.g., S. Waddock, “Building a New Institutional Infrastructure for Corporate Responsibility”, Academy of 
Management Perspective, 2008, vol. 22, issue 3, p. 87 (surveying the emerging institutional infrastructure for 
ensuring responsible corporate activity in the face of formal regulatory gaps). 
139 See, e.g., H. Torres, “Reforming the International Monetary Fund—Why its Legitimacy is at Stake”, Journal 
of International Economic Law, 2010, vol. 10, issue 3, p. 443. 
140 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Inequality Matters: Report on the World Social Situation, 
2013, p. 99, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/reports/InequalityMatters.pdf (last accessed 15 April 2017).   
141 For example, the IMF has recently begun recommending that client governments implement policies to 
facilitate better access to education, improved health outcomes, stronger labor laws and redistributive social 
welfare policies to help raise the income share of the poor and the middle class irrespective of the economic 
development of a country. See Department of Economic and. Social Affairs, op. cit., at 103–05; E. Dabla-Norris 
et al., op. cit., p.27. However, it is important for the IMF to avoid past mistakes and recognize that such policies 
should be implemented in a manner cognizant of local needs and conditions, not as one-size-fits-all programming. 
See E. Dabla-Norris et al., op. cit., p. 28. 
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the history of trade politics at least in the US shows that we cannot rely on this for anything as 
constitutive as the basic bargain underlying trade’s social contract. 
Instead, we should consider incorporating a financial transaction tax (FTT) into all new 
or renegotiated trade agreements. This would represent a paradigm shift in how we think of 
trade and its distributive effects, but the current crisis asks for nothing less than this kind of 
radical change in our thinking. An FTT linked to trade agreements offers a direct way of 
harnessing the wealth creation of free trade agreements themselves towards supporting 
domestic adjustment assistance programs. An FTT with revenue earmarked for adjustment 
assistance would place entities that benefit tremendously from trade liberalization—major 
financial institutions—in the role of assisting those who suffer most from the same.  
FTT proposals are not new, and a number of these mechanisms have been adopted or 
proposed around the globe142. While a comprehensive review of the extensive literature on 
FTTs, and a detailed exposition of the features of an FTT such as I am proposing, are beyond 
the scope of this essay143, the essence of the arrangement is that parties to a free trade agreement 
would agree that each party shall impose an incremental tax on specified financial transactions 
(such as securities, derivatives and currency trades) of anywhere from 0.01% to 0.1% (the rate 
to be the same in each member state). This is not enough to discourage productive investment 
transactions, yet it is enough to generate hundreds of millions for adjustment assistance for 
workers sharing the risks but not getting the benefits of trade’s joint venture. 
A social contract FTT would need to be carefully designed in terms of scope144 and 
jurisdiction145. Even with such jurisdictional and scope limitations, such a tax could generate 
considerable revenue towards funding adjustment assistance obligations. The EU Commission 
calculated that its earlier 2011 FTT proposal could generate as much as €57 billion with a tax 
                                                 
142 See F. Garcia, T. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 94–95. 
143 Ibid. pp. 95–98. 
144 It should be designed to tax wholesale capital market transactions (stocks, bonds, derivatives and currency 
trades) between major financial institutions such as banks, investment firms, insurance companies, pension funds, 
and hedge funds; and not “retail” transactions such as home mortgages and business loans. See generally Proposal 
for a Council Directive: Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, at 17, 
36, COM (2013) 71 final (Feb. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Proposal for a Council Directive] (weighing the costs and 
benefits of taxing various transactions and institutions, and concluding that certain institutions, including 
refinancing institutions, should not be taxed with an FTT). It is important for political as well as normative reasons 
that the tax not apply to ordinary consumers at the retail level. See L. Burman, W. Gale, The Pros and Cons of a 
Consumption Tax, Brookings (Mar. 3, 2005), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-pros-and-cons-of-a-
consumption-tax/ [https://perma.cc/WA73-KXJJ]. 
145 Jurisdictionally, taxable transactions could be defined as those between counterparties when at least one 
counterparty is resident within the free trade area, as the EU does, although in the context of free trade agreements 
thought should be given to whether the proposal should require both counterparties to be resident. Proposal for a 
Council Directive, op. cit., p. 18. 
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rate of 0.1% on all wholesale stock and bond transfers and 0.01% on all derivatives trades, with 
all twenty-seven Member States participating146. An FTT with the same tax rate and 
jurisdictional structure, if applied in the NAFTA zone today, could yield as much as $64 billion 
towards adjustment costs in the NAFTA area147. 
However, implemented and allocated, creating a trade-related FTT would be a 
breakthrough in trade adjustment financing and, more broadly, in mechanisms to address the 
social costs and inequality effects of trade. Linking such a tax to transactions within the 
economic zones that free trade agreements create would directly harness their wealth-creating 
potential and tie the funding for adjustment assistance to financial parties that benefit 
tremendously from the agreements themselves. Implementing such a reform would fulfill the 
social contract of trade and render it self-sustaining, rather than subject to the vicissitudes of 
budgetary politics, and help protect not only vulnerable workers but the trade liberalization 
process itself and all who stand to benefit from it. Any economic structure as powerful and 
invasive as the global economy requires no less, and as we are learning, we neglect this at our 
peril. 
CONCLUSION - CONSENT AND FAIRNESS IN A GLOBAL MARKET SOCIETY 
Referenda are not of course always a clear indicator of true public sentiment, as they 
can be manipulated by a variety of actors towards private ends that do not serve the public 
interest, as we saw in Costa Rica and, of course, Brexit. Nevertheless, referenda, especially in 
a time of resurgent economic populism, can be an accurate signal of where the fault lines lie, 
and in particular how the electorate is constructing—or can be manipulated to construct—the 
key narrative of “Us” and “Them”148. 
                                                 
146 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and 
Amending Directive, SEC (2011) 1102–03 final (Sept. 28, 2011). This would calculate to a tax yield of 0.3% of 
total EU nominal GDP for 2011 (€18.3 trillion), using GDP as a proxy for the tax base, although other measures 
such as total EU volume of wholesale capital market transactions could be more accurate. See, e.g., European 
Union GDP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/gdp (last visited May 9, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/3UQW-8FBV]. 
147 Assuming the same 0.3% calculation on a 2016 combined NAFTA GDP of $21.4 trillion. See Report for 
Selected Countries and Subjects, International Monetary Fund (Apr. 2017), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2016&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&
sort=subject&ds=.&br=1&c=273,156,111&s=NGDPD,PPPGDP,LP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=53&pr.y=13 
[https://perma.cc/R94U-J2S8]. To put this in perspective, the combined annual budget for all active labor market 
policies, TAA included, among the United States, Canada, and Mexico totaled $25 billion in 2015. 
148 On the destructive tendency of populism to construct and reinforce alienating binary oppositions, see Twenty-
First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; C. Mudde, 
“The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 2004, vol. 39, issue 4, p. 541. 
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Rather than simply bemoan the manipulations and distortions which fear works, or 
which fear leaves us vulnerable to, in the political process, we would be wise to look more 
closely at the issues and concerns underlying the volatility of the moment. In our case, insofar 
as globalization has collapsed the boundaries between the local and the global, then reimagining 
both trade and fairness in a global environment means reconstructing our paradigm so that 
artificial distinctions between opportunity and fairness for “Us”, and what passes as 
“opportunity” and “fairness” for “Them,” are eliminated.  
In particular, the Trump and Brexit referenda have brought it painfully home to all of 
us that we can no longer afford to assume that “Us” and “Them” are easily distinguishable by 
national boundaries (hence ignorable by the Global North). In reality, the comparison is a 
between those favored by economic globalization in its current form, and those who feel 
themselves to be left out, and these are transnational and even post-national categories that may 
include our closest neighbors. 
Successfully implementing a new trade agenda requires first that we understand that a 
post-Trump and Brexit trade policy, which is to say the economic policy for a new economic 
globalization, must be designed to operate in the new global socioeconomic reality. Trade and 
its pathologies outlined thus far are taking place on a global scale, with implications in all 
regions and economies of the world, as the global “backlash” against trade and globalization 
today vividly illustrates. If we are truly living in a global market and emerging global market 
society, as I believe we are, then we should regulate it appropriately, and seriously examine 
what kinds of social and other goods we expect a market society to deliver. 
Even more urgently, the emergence of global market society means that the grave 
shortcomings in the global regulatory structure today cannot be adequately addressed by even 
the most virulent populist national backlash, as Act Two of the Trump and Brexit dramas is 
making clear. Against this backdrop, a consensual basis for a fairer economic system has an 
intuitive market-based appeal that can make it useful for structuring a global market system. 
Insofar as markets thrive on consensual exchanges, so a global market society will thrive on a 
shared global understanding of the role of consent in exchange. 
